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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 13-1296
___________
JAMES T. KIMBALL,
Appellant
v.
DELBERT SAUERS, WARDEN
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 3:12-cv-01776)
District Judge: Honorable Edwin M. Kosik
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 and for Possible Issuance
of a Certificate of Appealability Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)
April 18, 2013
Before: FUENTES, FISHER and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: April 24, 2013 )
_________
OPINION
_________

PER CURIAM
James T. Kimball appeals pro se from the District Court’s order dismissing his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Because the appeal presents no substantial question,
we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order.
I.
In 2000, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida
convicted Kimball of conspiracy to distribute a prescription drug without a prescription
with the intent to defraud or mislead, and related offenses. The court sentenced Kimball
to 13 years’ imprisonment and Kimball unsuccessfully pursued a direct appeal. The
District Court denied his subsequent 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion.
In September 2012, while incarcerated at the Federal Corrections Complex at
Allenwood, Kimball filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. He alleged that, during his sentencing hearing, the trial judge accepted new
charges without requiring an indictment, found Kimball guilty of the new charges, and
then added 150 months onto Kimball’s sentence. Although he also alleged that the trial
judge refused to appoint counsel, Kimball stated that this particular issue was not the
basis of his habeas petition. The Magistrate Judge determined that Kimball failed to
demonstrate that a motion under section 2255 would be an inadequate or ineffective
remedy. Overruling Kimball’s objections to the Magistrate Judge’s report and
recommendations, the District Court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
Kimball filed a timely notice of appeal.
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II.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a).1 We exercise
plenary review over the District Court’s legal conclusions. Vega v. United States, 493
F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2007). We may summarily affirm a judgment of the District Court
on any basis supported by the record if the appeal does not raise a substantial question.
See I.O.P. 10.6; see also Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011).
III.
The District Court properly dismissed Kimball’s section 2241 petition for lack of
jurisdiction. A motion filed under section 2255 in the sentencing court is the presumptive
means for a federal prisoner to challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence.
Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002). By contrast, section 2241
“confers habeas jurisdiction to hear the petition of a federal prisoner who is challenging
not the validity but the execution of his sentence.” Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 48586 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that challenges to the execution of a sentence include, e.g.,
challenges to wrongful revocation of parole, place of imprisonment, and credit for time
served) (internal citations omitted). Here, Kimball claimed the trial court illegally
increased his sentence upon making a factual determination during his sentencing
hearing.2 We therefore agree with the District Court that Kimball’s claim is actually an
1

A certificate of appealability is not required to appeal the denial of a section
2241 petition. Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 2009).
2

See S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012).
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attack on the validity of his sentence and, as such, must be brought pursuant to section
2255.
However, a petitioner can seek relief under section 2241 if the remedy provided by
section 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(e); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 249-51 (3d Cir. 1997). “Section 2255 is not
inadequate or ineffective merely because the sentencing court does not grant relief, the
one-year statute of limitations has expired, or the petitioner is unable to meet the stringent
gatekeeping requirements of the amended § 2255.” Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner,
290 F.3d 536, 539 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam). Rather, the “safety valve” provided under
section 2255 is extremely narrow and applies only in unusual situations, such as those in
which a prisoner has had no prior opportunity to challenge his conviction for actions later
deemed to be non-criminal by an intervening change in law. See Okereke, 307 F.3d at
120 (citing In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251).
Section 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of Kimball’s
detention. Kimball seeks to invoke the “safety valve” by way of the Supreme Court’s
recent decision in S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012), which applied
the rule announced in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), to the imposition of
criminal fines. Importantly, though, Kimball has not argued that Southern Union deemed
his actions to be non-criminal. Rather, Kimball asked the District Court to hold that
Southern Union invalidates his sentence. This is an argument that falls within the normal
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ambit of section 2255, and outside of the unusual situation recognized by cases like
Dorsainvil.3
Kimball also expressed concern that section 2255 is inadequate for two additional
reasons. First, he stated that the trial court, which is the court that would hear any
successive section 2255 motion, will not admit to falsely imprisoning him. However, the
perceived bias of the trial court is not a basis for a section 2241 petition. See Tripati v.
Henman, 843 F.2d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that alleged judicial bias does not
render section 2255 inadequate or ineffective because a petitioner may raise the issue of
bias on appeal or in a motion for recusal). Second, Kimball acknowledged that his claim
would not likely succeed under the strict gatekeeping requirements that apply to
successive section 2255 motions. He may be correct, but it is well-settled that the mere
fact a petitioner faces the strict gatekeeping requirements applicable to successive section
2255 motions does not make section 2255 an inadequate or ineffective remedy. See
Cradle, 290 F.3d at 539. For these reasons, Kimball has not shown that section 2255 is
“inadequate or ineffective” to test the legality of his detention. See In re Dorsainvil, 119
F.3d at 251.
Accordingly, the District Court did not err in dismissing Kimball’s section 2241
petition for lack of jurisdiction. For substantially the same reasons set forth by the
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We note that, in any case, Kimball could have raised an Apprendi claim in his
initial section 2255 motion.
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District Court, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order dismissing Kimball’s
section 2241 petition. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
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